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ABSTRACT
Input on the skin is emerging as an interaction style. At CHI
2012, Coyle and colleagues identified an increase in the sense
of agency (SoA) as one benefit of skin input. However, their
study only compared skin input to button presses and has not,
to our knowledge, been replicated. Therefore, we had 24 par-
ticipants compare skin input to both button presses and touch-
pad input, measuring SoA using the Libet Clock paradigm.
We replicate previous findings regarding increased SoA in
skin versus button input and also find that SoA for skin is sig-
nificantly increased compared to touchpad input. Interview
data addressing subjective experience further support these
findings. We discuss agency and the experiences associated
with skin input, as well as differences to input with non-skin
devices.
Author Keywords
Skin input; sense of agency; user experience
ACM Classification Keywords
H.5.m. Information Interfaces and Presentation (e.g. HCI):
Miscellaneous
INTRODUCTION
The skin is emerging as a touch interface. Skin provides a
large surface for input that is always with us and that enables
rich types of interaction. Since 2010, several prototypes and
user studies have explored input on the skin [8, 13, 21, 25].
Although touch performance on the skin has so far been less
accurate than on external surfaces [11], several studies sug-
gest that users prefer input on the skin [7, 22, 23]. One reason
for this preference could be a better user experience. Besides
single evaluations of specific interfaces [7, 22], it is unclear
how touch input on the skin is experienced in general.
One possible mechanism behind the user-experience advan-
tage of skin input, is its association with a higher sense of
agency. Sense of agency is well-established term from neu-
roscience that refers to a user’s implicit sense of control, that
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their actions are responsible for an outcome [9, 10, 20]. In a
2012 study, Coyle and colleagues showed that users’ sense of
agency is higher in touching the skin than in pressing a button
[4]. This suggests that users may implicitly sense higher con-
trol in interacting on the skin than in interacting with external
devices.
However, these findings raise several questions. First, do
Coyle et al.’s findings reflect an increased sense of agency for
skin input over button input, or rather represent an implicit
preference for tap input over press input. Were the findings
inherent to some aspect of the button used, or do they gener-
alise to cover other devices? Second, it is not clear from the
paper by Coyle and colleagues whether the sense of agency is
reflected in participants’ subjective experience. Earlier work
has suggested that sense-of-agency is not necessarily associ-
ated with conscious experience reports [6]. Third and finally,
we are unaware of replications of the original findings. These
findings are increasingly cited as a motivation for research
on skin input [2, 12], so investigating whether they hold up
seems prudent.
This paper seeks to address the questions raised by Coyle et
al. We first replicate and extend the original study, adding
a touchpad input condition. This allows us to separate the
effects of using the skin from the input modality, and thus ad-
dress whether an increased sense of agency is a result of skin
input or touch input in general. We also collect interview data
to identify whether the participants subjectively experience a
greater sense of control with any of the input modalities. By
addressing the questions raised by Coyle et al., we seek to
contribute to the generalisable understanding of what makes
skin input good.
RELATED WORK
The sense of agency refers to a person’s feeling of control
over their actions and the consequences of those actions.
Moore [20] explains:
”When we make voluntary actions we tend not to feel as
though they simply happen to us, instead we feel as though
we are in charge. The sense of agency refers to this feeling of
being in the driving seat when it comes to our actions.”
This sense or feeling of agency is distinct from higher-level,
explicit judgements of agency that involve conscious deci-
sions [24]. Instead it involves lower-level sensorimotor pro-
cesses. It gives us an innate sense of control and ownership
of our actions and allows us to instinctively say, ”I did that”.
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The sense of agency has been the subject of a large body of
research within the cognitive-neuroscience community (see
Moore [20] for a review). Researchers in this field have de-
veloped techniques through which the sense of agency can be
empirically investigated.
More recently the sense of agency has become a focus for
the HCI community [3, 17]. This interest reflects the im-
portance of a person’s experience of control when interacting
with technology. It also reflects the degree to which key inter-
action features such as latency, accuracy, and input modality
may impact on the sense of agency. As noted by Coyle et
al. [4] the sense of agency is a surprisingly malleable experi-
ence. From a HCI perspective, this offers both opportunities
and pitfalls, and recent papers have begun to investigate the
conditions under which interactions with technology either
improve or reduce users’ sense of agency.
As noted above, Coyle et al. [4] suggested that skin-based in-
teraction can increase the sense of agency. They also found
that simple intelligent interfaces, which interpret and act on
users’ intentions, can either increase or decrease the sense of
agency, depending on the degree to which the interface of-
fers assistance. Cornelio Martinez et al. [2] found that touch-
less, mid-air haptic interfaces can provide a sense of agency
similar to that supported by physical interfaces. Conversely
Limerick et al. [18] found that speech interfaces reduce the
sense of agency. Thus, sense of agency is widely recognized
as important also outside of skin input.
Libet Clock Method
The Libet Clock method used by Coyle et al. [4] was devel-
oped by Haggard [9], who built it on the work of Libet et
al. [16]. The method is used for empirically measuring the
sense of agency from changes in perceived time. It builds on
the phenomena that the perceived time interval between in-
tentional actions and their outcomes is shorter than the actual
time interval (Figure 1). For example, when a person presses
a button which causes a beep after a short time interval, it is
likely that the action is perceived to have happened later and
the beep earlier than they actually did. The first of these phe-
nomena is called action binding, and the latter outcome bind-
ing. The sum of these factors describes the main dependent
variable, called intentional binding, which correlates with a
sense of personal agency.
EXPERIMENT
We replicate the Libet Clock experiment of Coyle and col-
leagues with extensions of (a) adding a touchpad as a third
input device, and (b) eliciting subjective feedback from par-
ticipants using interviews.
The motivation behind (a) was to pursue further insights into
whether the difference Coyle et al. found in intentional bind-
ing relate to using a body versus an external device for in-
put, or to the input method, that is, taps versus presses. We
hypothesised that the smaller intentional binding with but-
ton presses is caused by the intrinsic difference in the in-
put modalities: Button press involves three states (released,
touched, press) and tap on the skin two (released, touched).
Furthermore, the selection time with a button press can be
Figure 1. Time perception in an intentional action (a), and an uninten-
tional action (b). For intentional actions, the perceived interval between
action and outcome is shorter than the actual interval, while for unin-
tentional actions the perceived interval is longer than the actual.
Figure 2. The measurements and calculations used to assess Intentional
Binding for an action/outcome condition, using the Libet Clock method.
A fixed action/outcome interval of 250 ms is used for all active trials.
ambiguous (i.e., whether the selection happens during a but-
ton press, at the bottom of it, or when releasing). Therefore,
we added a touchpad condition, which allows us to compare
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Figure 3. The protocol for the active conditions in the experiment. Baseline conditions omit either the action or the beep. The Libet Clock on the right
as shown on a display in the experiment.
a two-state input method similar to tapping on the skin, but
on an external device.
The motivation behind (b) was to gain insights on how the
use of the three interfaces are subjectively experienced. This
allows speculation about whether differences in intentional
binding transfer into differences in the experience of interac-
tion.
We emphasize the replication aspect of the present experi-
ment because replications are rare in HCI. Hornbæk et al. [15]
found that replications represent only 3% of a sample of more
than 800 CHI papers. Others have similarly argued for a
need to do more replications, for instance, in the RepliCHI
initiative [26]. In this case, a replication is necessary, as the
methodology requires a within-participants design, and there-
fore simply comparing new results from the touchpad condi-
tion to the results of Coyle et al. would not have been a valid
approach. This replication is also overdue because the find-
ings of Coyle et al. [4] are often cited as a benefit of skin-
based interaction (e.g., [2, 12]). On the one hand, we do a
strict replication [14] including conditions similar to those
used by Coyle et al. On the other hand, we add a condi-
tion (point a above), obtain complementary measures (point
b above), and run an independent study with different partic-
ipants, experimenter, and hardware.
Task
The Libet Clock (Figure 3) consists of a clock face with an
arm that rotates clockwise through a full cycle once every
2560ms. The participant sits in front of the screen looking at
the clock, and is asked to report where the rotating arm on the
clock was pointing when an action (input) was performed, or
when an outcome (beep) was observed. This task is similar
to that used by Coyle et al.
Design
The experiment followed a within-subjects design with the
three input interfaces (Button, Skin, and Touchpad). For each
interface four measurements are collected: Action Baseline,
Action Active, Outcome Baseline, and Outcome Active. (Fig-
ure 2) illustrates these four measurements and the calcula-
tions for the intentional binding effect. The conditions for
measurements are described below in the procedure.
The order of the interfaces and the order of the measure-
ments with each interface were balanced using Latin Squares.
The input interfaces were used one at a time to collect all
the measurements. Whereas Coyle and colleagues collected
40 repetitions for each measurement, we used 30 repetitions
to maintain a similar experiment duration and to prevent fa-
tigue and loss of attention despite adding the touchpad con-
ditions. Compared to Coyle et al., we added participants to
counter effects of a smaller number of repetitions, as well
as to cover balancing of conditions including the additional
touchpad condition. The experiment duration was approxi-
mately 80 minutes.
Apparatus
The experimental setup is shown in Figure 4. The three inter-
face conditions were set up as follows.
BUTTON: Similar to Coyle et al., we used an Enter -key of a
USB -connected numpad for the Button condition.
SKIN: For the Skin condition we used a piezo-electric con-
tact microphone similar to that used in Coyle et al. The piezo
sensor with a diameter of 2.7mm was wrapped on the partic-
ipant’s forearm with a medical bandage. In our experiment
the piezo was located on the opposite (posterior) side of the
arm compared to Coyle’s study. We decided to use the pos-
terior side because that allowed the participants to maintain
a natural and comfortable posture, and us to place each in-
put interface to the same location on the table in front of the
participant. The piezo sensor was connected to the computer
running the experimental software via a high-fidelity sound-
card (Focusrite Scarlett 6i6 2nd Gen).
TOUCHPAD: The MacBook’s touchpad was used for the
Touchpad conditions. The tap could be performed anywhere
Figure 4. Setup for the three input conditions: Skin, Touchpad, and
Button. The input interface was always brought in front of the subject
on a designated area (the black rectangle on marked on the table). A
separate screen displayed the interface and the Libet Clock.
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on the touchpad’s active area. The keyboard and the screen of
the MacBook were not used during the study and were cov-
ered with black cardboard to prevent participant distraction.
No audio feedback was used with the touchpad, because the
beep sound in this Libet clock experiment is already used for
measuring perception of outcome.
A designated area on the table, in front of the participant, was
used as the input area for each interface condition (Figure 4).
The touchpad and the numpad were stowed away behind the
desktop display during other conditions, and the left arm was
kept on the side of the table during Touchpad and Button con-
ditions.
Coyle provided the experimental software used in their orig-
inal Libet Clock study. We used the software for displaying
the Libet Clock, running the trials, and for logging the actual
times and the reported perceived times. In our experiment
the clock size was the same 100 pixels in diameter, and it
was displayed on a screen with 1920 x 1080 resolution. We
used a MacBook Pro (2013) for running the software and col-
lecting the data. The original software could process sensor
signals and recognise taps on the skin, and register actions
from button presses. The software was extended to support
the Touchpad condition.
Procedure
Before starting the Libet Clock trials, the experimenter en-
sured that all the input interfaces worked reliably. The signal
processing features for detecting taps on the skin were ad-
justed (increasing sensitivity from the default settings) until
10 subsequent taps could be detected.
The participants were first introduced to the tasks of recording
the perceived action and outcome times from the Libet Clock.
The participants then had a practice round for each of the four
measurement types with each interface. The touchpad was
used by tapping (i.e., lifting the finger instead of holding it
on the surface and clicking), and the skin was instructed to be
used in the same way.
Before beginning the blocks of 30 trials for each interface and
each measure, the participants viewed on-screen instructions
telling them to record either (a) the perceived action or (b)
the perceived outcome time. After reading the instructions,
the experimenter revealed the clock face on the screen.
The procedure for the trials is depicted in Figure 3. To start
a trial, the participant pressed a foot switch. This caused the
clock arm to appear at a random position and start to rotate.
In the three trials requiring an action, participants were in-
structed to wait the clock arm to rotate through at least one
full round before performing the action. The random starting
point and waiting for the arm to rotate before performing an
action helped to discourage planning of action times.
At a fixed 250ms interval after the action, a buzzer sound
was played as an outcome. In the outcome baseline condi-
tion where no action was performed, the sound was played
at a random time between 5000 and 7500ms after the foot
switch was pressed to start the trial. After the action or the
outcome, the clock arm continued to rotate for a random
time (between 1500-2500ms) and then disappeared. When
the clock arm disappeared, the participant told the experi-
menter the perceived time of action or outcome, depending
on the current condition. The experimenter typed the time on
an input dialogue on the screen. The purpose of telling the
perceived times to the experimenter instead of simply typing
those themselves was to encourage the participants to pay at-
tention to the task. This way, the participant was also able to
double check that there are no errors in the reported times.
After the all Libet Clock trials were finished, the participants
were interviewed. The interview was semi-structured, always
starting with a question on the experienced differences in us-
ing the three interfaces, and if not already covered in the first
answer, followed up by questions on the experienced speed,
comfort, and control of the interfaces.
Participants
Data were collected from 24 right-handed participants (10 fe-
males, with an average age of 30.95 years). All of them used
a computer keyboard and a laptop touchpad daily.
In two cases our system for capturing touches on the skin was
not working effectively. However, this behavior was detected
already in the beginning of the experiment, and the experi-
ment was discontinued. The next participants were allocated
to replace the discontinued ones, resulting to a complete data
set of 24 participants.
Three participants, however, misinterpreted experimental in-
structions in one of the conditions. By examining the action
and outcome binding values, we found that two participants
had over 200ms values in action binding, and one participant
in outcome binding with one of the input interfaces. Because
the outcome was played always at a 250ms interval after the
actions, these high values imply that the participants had in-
correctly reported either outcome values (beep time) when the
instructions were to report action values (input), or the oppo-
site. Therefore, all data from these three participants were
excluded, leaving 21 participants for the analysis.
RESULTS
In this section we report the results of the Libet Clock exper-
iment, compare those results to the original study of Coyle
and colleagues, and describe the interview data.
Intentional Binding
Figure 5 shows the results from the Libet Clock experiment.
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA shows a significant
difference between the intentional binding values with the
three interfaces, F (2,20) = 8.19, p = .001, showing a medium
effect size of eta squared η2 = 0.09. A post-hoc analysis with
a Bonferroni corrected paired sample t-test shows this differ-
ence is significant between two pairs: Skin and Button (p =
.005), and Skin and Touchpad (p < .001), with respective ef-
fect sizes of Cohen’s d = 0.55 and d = 0.67. No significant
difference was found between the mean total binding values
with Button and Touchpad.
A Bonferroni corrected paired sample t-test further shows sig-
nificantly higher outcome binding with Skin input compared
to Button (p = .007) and to Touchpad (p < .001).
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Figure 5. The upper values and the bars denote the mean action, out-
come and total binding times in ms for each input condition in the
present experiment, as well as the total binding times from Coyle et al.
Higher binding values indicate a greater sense of agency. Standard de-
viations in brackets and in error bars.
These results replicated the significant difference Coyle and
colleagues found between the intentional bindings with the
Skin and the Button. Moreover, the average values and the
difference are consistent: Input on the skin (mean total bind-
ing of 95.53ms) in this experiment increased intentional bind-
ing compared to Button (54.28ms) and Touchpad (41.32ms),
while Coyle et al. [4] reported the total binding of 109.47ms
for Skin and 42.92ms for Button. Their effect size was
d = 0.91. The total binding is further consistent with ear-
lier binding experiments using button input for actions [10,
19].
Our findings on outcome binding values (70.52ms for Skin
and 36.60 for Button) are also consistent with those of Coyle
and colleagues (79.82ms for Skin and 36.11 for Button). In
contrast, the action binding values for Button in our study
were in average higher than in Coyle’s, thus also leaving the
difference to Skin smaller in action binding.
Subjective Experiences
We used the interview data to collect the adjectives the par-
ticipants used to describe experiences with each interface.
Overall, the participants described the experience using the
Button with the largest number of positive adjectives (48
instances across the 21 participants), followed by the Skin
(18 instances). When asked which interface the participants
found the fastest, 10 responded the Button, and four the Skin
and the Touchpad, while the rest of the participants did not
clearly name an interface for fastest experience. Button was
also found to offer the most control over the task (Button:
11 participants, Skin: three participants, Touchpad: four par-
ticipants, the rest did not name any), and the most comfort
(Button: 10 participants, Skin: four, Touchpad: four, the rest
did not name any).
In addition, the participants described the Skin interface as
responsive, on point, easy, nice, natural, efficient, great, and
relaxed. Button was similarly described as easy and respon-
sive, and also familiar, normal, and simple. The Touchpad
was described as easy and direct.
Familiarity of using a keypad for input explains some of the
preferences for the Button interface. For example, P13 ex-
plained that ”the button was definitely more comfortable, be-
cause I was more used to [it]”, and P17 that ”The button press-
ing on the keyboard felt like it was a game, like a rhythm
game. I was familiar with that sort of thing.”
In contrast, the novelty of the experience of using the skin
for input was reported in both positive and neutral comments.
For example, P2 ”didn’t expect [tapping the arm] to be as
good as it was.”, and ”actually found it easier than using es-
pecially the [touchpad]”. P6 further described the Skin being
”A little bit weird, but quite nice as well. Very scientific and
modern”, similar to P4, commenting ”That was very weird.
A new experience, and I guess you’re not very used to it, so
you don’t know how to react to that feeling.”
Accommodating to the novelty of the Skin interface was ex-
perienced during the study. The participants told that ”it took
me some time to accommodate.” (P3), and that it ”felt great.
It takes some time getting used to, but it’s fun”. (P4). Al-
though drawbacks relating to the novelty were experienced,
some of those were also overcome. P16 described that ”I
liked tapping my arm. In the beginning I thought it was a
bit confusing, but then it was just tapping one’s arm. It kinda
felt nice. After pressing my arm for a while it felt more natu-
ral”. P6 further explained that ”you need a little more brain to
operate your arm. Because I’m used to tapping my keyboard
or my Ipad, I can take my thought off it I don’t think about
it, but when I have to tap my arm I think that I’m touching
myself. And that’s a new experience.”
The Skin and Touchpad input were also experienced similar
in some aspects: P1 reported that ”there were some similar-
ities between using the touchpad and the skin”, and P19 that
the experiment task ”was a little bit more difficult with the
button, and I think it was almost the same with the touchpad
than with the arm.”
Touchpad, however, was experienced to lack the feedback
which the Skin and the Button provided. Participants de-
scribe, for instance, that ”[The touchpad] was a bit different
because you couldn’t feel when you touched it, but you could
feel that you touched the computer, so there was no counter
reaction” (P4), and that ”It feels fine, but because there is not
a rebound or an effect from after tapping, I prefer the button.”
(P10).
Moreover, the participants compared the interfaces in terms
of feedback. For example, P14 told that the ”[Button] gives
very concrete feedback. I could feel it be pressed, and the
touchpad doesn’t give that same feedback”, while on the arm
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”I feel it”. P16 continues explaining that ”When I tapped the
enter button it goes down, and when I tap my arm then I feel
it. But when I tap [the touchpad] I don’t feel it; no feedback.”
P20 told that ”I prefer the button because I feel like it’s more
of a physical thing that you press so you’re more sure that you
actually pressed a thing. You feel more in contact with the
function because you can feel it on your own body. Pressing
your own body feels that you are more connected to what’s
happening on the screen.”. P20 further highlights the feed-
back as a benefit of skin input by describing that ”I actually
thought that I had better feeling of [the clock] when I used
my arm as an interface, because that was of course a physical
pressure so that might send some signal to the brain”.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we sought to address a number of questions
raised by Coyle et al. [4] in their original paper on the sense
of agency in skin input. First, we sought to replicate their
findings, in order to confirm the increase of agency with on-
skin interaction. Second, we wished to address whether the
original findings generalise to other devices, or are inherent to
differences between tapping on the skin and pushing a button.
Finally, we were interested to explore whether an increased
implicit sense of agency is also reflected through subjective
comments.
In this paper, we have replicated the finding that skin input
increases the sense of agency, originally reported by Coyle
et al. [4]. Our effect is medium-sized, and falls within the
confidence intervals of the effect size of the original study
(ours: d = 0.55 , .95 CI= [0.19, 0.90]; Coyle et al.: d =
0.91, .95 CI= [0.37, 1.44]). We obtained the per participant
averages of total binding values found in the original study.
We used these to calculate the overall estimation of the effect
size. For these two studies the combined effect size is d =
0.710.
We also conceptually replicate the finding of Coyle et al. by
showing that intentional binding is higher with the skin than
when interacting with a touchpad (d = 0.67, again a medium
effect). This is significant because it rules out the explanation
that the difference was incidental to the button used. In par-
ticular, it invalidates the concern that taps and presses makes
a difference to this effect. Thus, our findings support the idea
that the difference is due to using the body as an input device.
Future studies should seek further insights into the differences
between sense of agency across bodies and devices. For ex-
ample, skin interaction is popular for mobile input [8, 11,
13, 25]. Therefore, comparisons could provide insights into
the effects of dynamic vs. static input location (e.g., on-skin
vs. mobile touchscreen), or rigidity of the input surface (e.g.,
pressure input on skin vs. touchscreen). When considering
these further explorations, researchers should note the fol-
lowing challenges. First, intentional binding studies require
many repetitions [4], and are thus lengthy and taxing to par-
ticipants. As such, it is infeasible to compare many conditions
simultaneously. Second, the Libet Clock paradigm requires
binary selection modalities and was in the study replicated
here used with indirect input. As such, other agency mea-
suring techniques, such as Interval Estimation [4], would be
needed to support exploration of modalities such as pressure-
input (continuous input) or touchscreen input (direct input).
Beyond replicating the effects seen by Coyle et al. [4], we
began tackling the question of whether differences in sense
of agency matter to the user experience. In particular, do
medium-sized effects impact how participants experience an
interaction? Our data show no clear associations between
skin input and experiences that one would a priori consider
related to sense of agency. On the most basic level, the button
was perceived as affording more control. Similarly, the but-
ton was also deemed faster and more comfortable than using
the skin. The skin and touchpad conditions differed in par-
ticipants’ assessment of feedback in interaction: In particular
the experience of feedback might be expected to be related to
sense of agency but such correlation was not found between
skin and button input in this study. Although some partici-
pants described the skin as ’responsive’, ’efficient’, and ’nat-
ural’, all terms that may suggest an explicit sense of agency,
their use was not pervasive across participants. Thus, our data
suggest an agreement with the explanation that the implicit
sense of agency does not necessarily correspond to conscious
experience (e.g., [6]).
Future work should investigate this question further. A first
step could be to empirically compare the devices we investi-
gated again, but also including measures of control, natural-
ness [1], comfort, and subjective duration [5] —to name a few
measures that sense of agency could likely affect. This could
be done in a Libet Clock experiment but also in a more natu-
ralistic comparison of conditions similar to the three tested
herein. Furthermore, our subjective data suggests the ex-
istence of novelty effects. While the implicit Libet Clock
paradigm is not impacted by such effects, the counterpart sub-
jective experience may be, and future work should mitigate
this when seeking to draw parallels.
The sense of agency has gained a lot of attention in HCI (e.g.,
[2, 18]). But if agency means little or nothing to the conscious
user experience, then perhaps this attention is misplaced.
CONCLUSION
Input on the skin is emerging as an interaction style; earlier
work has suggested that this is tied to the sense of agency
when interacting on ones own skin. In particular, Coyle et
al. [4] provided data showing increased intentional binding
for on-skin interaction compared to interaction using a but-
ton. We have replicated these findings and shown that the
differences in agency can also be found with other devices
than buttons (here, a touchpad). We also showed that the sub-
jective experience of interaction is not affected in a straight-
forward manner by these differences, calling for further work
that investigates if sense of agency affects conscious user ex-
perience.
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